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Abstract We study the relation among some security parameters for vectorial Boolean functions which pre-
vent attacks on the related block cipher. We focus our study on a recently-introduced security criterion, called
weak differential uniformity, which prevents the existence of an undetectable trapdoor based on imprimitive
group action. We present some properties of functions with low weak differential uniformity, especially for
the case of power functions and 4-bit S-Boxes.
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1 Introduction
Differential and linear attacks are major cryptanalytic tools which apply to most cryptographic algorithms.
Therefore, functions which guarantee a high resistance to these attacks have been extensively studied. In par-
ticular, those with low differential uniformity and high non-linearity, e.g. Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN)
functions or Almost Bent (AB) functions, have received a lot of attention. Since in the design of a block
cipher an invertible S-Box of even dimension is usually needed, there is strong interest in non-linear permu-
tations. However, we know examples of APN permutations in even dimension only for dimension 6, for more
details see [6]. For the highly interesting cases of dimension 4 and 8, the cipher designer will certainly use
4-differentially uniform S-Boxes, but she will also look at other security criteria, if applicable, although it is
not obvious which. Besides, even a 4-differentially uniform S-Box can hide a trapdoor in the related cipher,
if not carefully chosen. Algebraic trapdoors can be very dangerous, especially when they are undetectable
[25].
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We are investigating the security criterion introduced recently in [11], called weak differential uniformity.
As shown in [11], any cipher (with a prescribed structure) possessing a weakly-APN vectorial Boolean
function as S-Box cannot be successfully attacked using a trapdoor based on imprimitive group action.
Indeed, ciphers suffering from such a trapdoor have been built in [24] and might be used as standards without
anyone realizing the trapdoor existence. So, a designer would have advantage in choosing an invertible S-
Box which is simultaneously weakly APN and 4-differentially uniform, which exists for dimension 4 and 8
(and actually for any dimension). Results in [11] are generalized on any field in [1], where again the notion
of weakly APN plays an important security role.
In Section 2 we recall the attack [24] that can be mounted on an AES-like cipher when an imprimi-
tive group action is present. We recall also how a weakly APN S-Box would make this attack ineffective
[11], motivating thus this security criterion. In Section 3 we present some first results on weak differen-
tial uniformity. In Section 4 we specialize to the case of monomial functions, where we see an interesting
connection with the property of having the image of a function derivative as an affine space, which is an
unexpected weakness within the underlying algorithms (see for instance [10,12]). In Section 5 we relate
the weak differential uniformity with other algebraic properties of vectorial Boolean functions, in particu-
lar with the degrees of both the function components and the function derivative components. We can thus
improve some results given in [18] and give a formal proof of Fact 4 in [18]. In Section 6, we give some
results about the partially bent (quadratic), components of a weakly APN permutation and we note that in
even dimension weakly APN functions cannot be partially bent (quadratic), behaving thus as APN functions
[23,26]. In Section 7 we give some other properties of vectorial Boolean functions whose derivatives have
no constant components, allowing also a deeper understanding of 4-bit S-Boxes.
2 Cryptographic motivations for studying weak differential uniformity
Most block ciphers used for real-life applications are iterated block ciphers, i.e. obtained by a composition
of several key-dependent permutations of the message space called “round functions”. Let C be a block
cipher, i.e. a set of permutations {ϕk}k∈K of the message space V , where K is the key space. An interesting
problem is determining the properties of the permutation group Γ∞(C ) =Γ∞ generated by the round functions
of C that imply weaknesses of the cipher.
A property of Γ∞ considered undesirable is the imprimitivity. Paterson [24] showed that if this group is
imprimitive, then it is possible to embed a trapdoor in the cipher. On the other hand, if the group is primitive
no such trapdoor can be inserted. We give the idea of the basic chosen-plaintext attack by Paterson. First we
recall what it is an imprimitive group. Let G be a finite group acting transitively on a set V . We will write the
action of g ∈G on an element v ∈V as vg. A partition B of V is said to be G-invariant if Bg ∈B, for every
B ∈B and g ∈ G. A partition B is trivial if B = {V} or B = {{v}|v ∈V}. A non-trivial G-invariant parti-
tion B of V is called a block system for the action of G on V . Each B ∈B is called a block of imprimitivity.
G is called imprimitive in its action on V if it admits a block system, otherwise it is called primitive. Now
we suppose that Γ∞ is imprimitive. Let us fix any k ∈K and let ϕk ∈ Γ∞ be the related encryption function.
Let B1, . . . ,Br be a non-trivial block system for the group Γ∞. This attack works only if we know an efficient
algorithm (block sieving) with input any vector v ∈ V and output the (unique) block Bl containing v. The
classical case is when the block system is formed by all the cosets of a known vector subspace of V . Paterson
gives this trapdoor for a DES-like cipher (for more details on DES see [17]), but it can be extended to the
case of AES-like ciphers. We now describe the attack.
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Preprocessing performed ones per key
We choose one plaintext mi in each set Bi, obtaining the corresponding ciphertext ci. Then the effect of ϕk
on each block Bi is determined,
ci = miϕk ∈ B j ⇒ Biϕk = B j.
Real-time processing
Given any ciphertext c, we can compute l such that c ∈ Bl via the block sieving. Then, we can find the
plaintext m of c by examining the block Blϕ−1k .
Attack cost
The preprocessing costs r encryptions. For any intercepted ciphertext, the search for the corresponding plain-
text is limited to a block, whose size is |V |
r
, requiring at most |V |
r
encryptions.
Moreover, a cipher C may have another weakness if Γ∞(C ) is of small size, since not every possible per-
mutation of the message space can be realized by the cipher [14,16]. Attacks on ciphers whose encryptions
generate small groups were given in [21].
In [11] the authors define a class of iterated block ciphers, called translation based ciphers ([11], Def-
inition 3.1), large enough to include many common ciphers (as AES [15], SERPENT [2] and PRESENT
[5]), and provide some conditions on the S-Boxes of these ciphers that guarantee the primitivity of Γ∞. In
particular, in Theorem 4.4 of [11], it is proved that if C is a translation based cipher such that any S-Box
satisfies, for some integer r,
– the weak 2r-differential uniformity (see Definition 2 in the next section), and
– the strongly r-anti-invariance (it means that no S-Box of C sends a proper subspace of codimension l of
the plaintext space to another proper subspace of codimension l),
then Γ∞(C ) is primitive.
In Theorem 2 of [12] , under the same hypotheses plus an additional cryptographic assumption, i.e. none of
the images of the derivatives of any S-Box is a coset of a linear subspace of the message space, it is proved
that Γ∞ is the alternating group, and so, in other words, Γ∞ is huge.
Starting from these cryptographic motivations, in [18] the authors provide a deep analysis of 4-bit vec-
torial Boolean functions focusing on the weak differential uniformity. They determine several conditions,
computational and theoretical, which are either sufficient or necessary for a 4-bit vectorial Boolean func-
tion to be weakly 2-differential uniform (weakly APN). Moreover they consider two non-linearity measures,
nˆ( f ) and ni( f ) where f is a vectorial Boolean function (see Section 5), and they give some relations between
such measures and the weakly APNness.
If the image of a derivative of an S-Box of a cipher C is an affine space then this can be another weak-
ness of C . For example, in the yet unpublished PhD Thesis [7] the author shows how this condition could
induce a weakness based on the action of an alternative operation, called hidden sum, for which the vector
space structure of the message space is preserved. In [8] some differential properties for permutations in the
affine group of the message space with respect to a hidden sum are investigated. In [1] the authors present
conditions on the S-box able to prevent a type of trapdoors based on this alternative operation. One of these
conditions is that the derivatives of the S-box do not map the space to an affine subspace. Moreover, also
for the hash function case, in [10] the authors show an attack on a SHA-3 candidate (Maraca) [20], which
is especially effective when the associated vectorial Boolean function has this feature. In Section 4 we will
show a sufficient condition for monomial weakly APN vectorial Boolean functions in order to have that none
of their derivatives sends the message space to a proper affine subspace (Corollary 2).
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3 Weak differential uniformity
Let F= F2. Let m≥ 1, any vectorial Boolean function (vBf) f from Fm to Fm can be expressed uniquely as a
univariate polynomial in F2m [x]. Any time we write that f is a vBf, we will implicit mean f :Fm →Fm. When
f is also invertible we call it a vBf permutation. We denote the derivative of f by ˆfa(x) = f (x+ a)+ f (x),
where a ∈ Fm \ {0}, and the image of f by Im( f ) = { f (x) | x ∈ Fm}.
A notion of non-linearity for S-Boxes that has attracted a lot of research.
Definition 1 Let m≥ 1. Let f be a vBf, for any a,b ∈ Fm we define
δ f (a,b) = |{x ∈ Fm | ˆfa(x) = b}|.
The differential uniformity of f is
δ ( f ) = max
a,b∈Fma 6=0
δ f (a,b).
f is said δ -differentially uniform if δ = δ ( f ).
Those functions with δ ( f ) = 2 are said Almost Perfect Nonlinear (APN).
There is a generalization of differential uniformity presented recently in [11], which we recall in the
following definition.
Definition 2 Let f be a vBf. f is weakly δ -differential uniform if
|Im( ˆfa)|> 2
m−1
δ , ∀a ∈ F
m \ {0}.
If f is weakly 2-differential uniform, it is said weakly APN.
As shown in [11], a δ -differentially uniform map is weakly δ -differential uniform. Moreover the follow-
ing result holds
Lemma 1 The weak δ -differential uniformity is affine-invariant.
Proof If f is weakly δ -differential uniform and g(x) = D( f (Cx+ c))+d, for some m×m matrices C and D
with coefficients in Fm and for some c,d ∈ Fm, then we have
gˆa(x) = D( f (C(x+ a)+ c))+ d+D( f (Cx+ c))+ d
= D( f (Cx+Ca+ c))+D( f (Cx+ c))
= D( ˆfCa(Cx+ c)),
for any a ∈ Fm, and so Im(gˆa) = D(Im( ˆfCa)).
Since C and D are permutations, we have that weak δ -differential uniformity is affine-invariant.
Remark 1 In [4] another non-linearity notion, the locally almost perfect nonlinearity (locally APN), is in-
troduced. Note that, in general, the local-APN property is not equivalent to the weak-APN property. For
example, the monomial function x11 defined over F6 is weakly APN but it is not locally APN. However, for
any dimension there exist Boolean functions that are both locally APN and weakly APN, e.g. the patched
inversion.
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Remark 2 Suppose that f is not a monomial function. If f is weakly δ -differential uniform then f−1 is not
necessarily weakly δ -differential uniform. We provide the following example. Let f : F4 → F4 be
f (x) = x14 + e10x13 + ex12 + e2x11 + e9x10 + e8x9 + e3x8 + e5x7
+ e5x6 + e11x5 + e8x3 + e10x2 + ex+ e12,
where e is a primitive element of F16 such that e4 = e+ 1. The inverse of f is
f−1(x) = x14 + e10x13 + e14x12 + e8x11 + e7x10 + e10x9 + x8 + e5x7 + e14x6
+ e2x5 + e7x4 + e5x3 + e14x2 + e11x+ e14.
We have that f is weakly APN while f−1 is only weakly 4-differential uniform.
We recall that two vBf’s f and g are called CCZ-equivalent (Carlet-Charpin-Zinoviev equivalent) if
their graphs G f = {(x, f (x)) | x ∈ Fm} and Gg = {(x,g(x)) | x ∈ Fm} are affine equivalent, while they are
called EA-equivalent (Extended Affine equivalent) if there exist three affine functions λ , λ ′ and λ ′′ such that
g = λ ′ ◦ f ◦λ +λ ′′.
Remark 2 and the fact that a vBf f is CCZ-equivalent to f−1 imply the following result.
Proposition 1 The weak differential uniformity is not CCZ invariant.
On the other hand, weak differential uniformity behaves well with respect to EA invariance, as shown
below.
Proposition 2 The weak differential uniformity is EA invariant.
Proof Let f and g be EA equivalent and let f be weakly δ -differential uniform.
Then, g = λ ′ ◦ f ◦λ +λ ′′ = g′+λ ′′, with g′ affine equivalent to f (and λ ′′ is an affinity over Fm).
Since weak differential uniformity is affine invariant, we have |Im( ˆg′a)|> 2m−1/δ for all a ∈ Fm \ {0}.
Note that Im(gˆa) = {b+λ ′′(a) | b ∈ Im( ˆg′a)}= Im( ˆg′a)+λ ′′(a) and so |Im(gˆa)|= |Im( ˆg′a)|> 2m−1/δ for
any a ∈ Fm \ {0}.
As seen in Section 2, if the image of a derivative of an S-Box is an affine space, then there may be a
weakness in the cipher. In this direction the following theorem can be useful. Moreover, in Section 4 we
prove a stronger result regarding the monomial functions (Corollary 2).
Theorem 1 Let f be a vBf on Fm that is weakly APN but not APN. Then, there exists a ∈ Fm \{0} such that
Im( ˆfa) is not a coset of a subspace W ⊆ Fm.
Proof By contradiction suppose that for any a 6= 0 we have Im( ˆfa) = w+W for some w ∈ Fm and W vector
subspace of Fm. Since f is weakly APN, |Im( ˆfa)|> 2m−2, thus dimF(W ) = m− 1. Therefore, we have that
ˆfa is a 2-to-1 function for all a 6= 0, which means f is APN, contradicting our assumption.
4 Power functions
In this section we focus on monomial functions, also called power functions. In particular we prove that the
weak differential uniformity of a function f is equal to that of f−1, and we show some properties of Im( ˆfa).
In this section when we write f = xd we mean that f is a power function on F2m for any 0 ≤ d ≤ 2m−1.
We will also identify F2m and Fm without any further comments.
The following result is well-known (see for instance [3]).
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Lemma 2 Let f (x) = xd . For any a,a′ ∈ Fm, with a,a′ 6= 0, and any 0 ≤ i≤ 2m, we have
|{b ∈ Fm | δ f (a′,b) = i}|= |{b ∈ Fm | δ f (a,b) = i}|.
In other words, the differential characteristics of a monomial function depend only on b.
Definition 3 Let f (x) = xd and 0≤ i≤ 2m. We denote by ωi the number of output differences of b that occur
i times, that is
ωi( f ) = |{b ∈ Fm | δ f (1,b) = i}|.
The differential spectrum of f is the sequence of ωi( f )’s, denoted by S( f ).
Remark 3 Note that if a monomial function f has 2s-to-1 derivatives then it is weakly 2s-differential uniform,
since |Im( ˆfa)|= 2m−s for any a ∈ Fm \ {0}.
The following lemma is well-known, for instance see Lemma 1 in [3].
Lemma 3 Let f (x) = xd and g(x) = xe. If
– gcd(2m− 1,d) = 1 and ed ≡ 1 mod (2m− 1),
or
– e ≡ 2kd mod (2m− 1), for some k, 0 ≤ k ≤ m,
then S( f ) = S(g).
From Lemma 3 we obtain our first result.
Corollary 1 Let f (x) = xd with gcd(2m − 1,d) = 1. Then f is weakly δ -differential uniform if and only if
f−1 is weakly δ -differential uniform.
Proof For a power function we have
|Im( ˆfa)|= |Im( ˆf1)|= 2m−ω0, ∀a 6= 0.
From Lemma 3 we have ω0( f ) = ω0( f−1), and this concludes the proof.
Consider the following lemma for a power function (not necessarily a permutation).
Lemma 4 Let f (x) = xd . If there exists a ∈ Fm, a 6= 0, such that Im( ˆfa) is a coset of a subspace of Fm, then
Im( ˆfa′) is a coset of subspace of Fm for all a′ 6= 0.
Proof We have Im( ˆfa) = w+W , where W is a F-vector subspace of Fm and w ∈ Fm. If we now consider
a′ ∈ Fm \ {0} we have
ˆfa′(x) = (x+ a′)d + xd =
(
a′
a
)d [(
x
a
a′
+ a
)d
+
(
x
a
a′
)d]
=
(
a′
a
)d
ˆfa
(
x
a
a′
)
.
Therefore, Im( ˆfa′) =
(
a′
a
)d
Im( ˆfa) =
(
a′
a
)d
w+
(
a′
a
)d
W = w′+W ′. Since W ′ = (a′/a)dW , also W ′ is an
F-vector subspace of Fm and our claim is proved.
Here we give a sufficient condition for a power function to thwart the aforementioned weakness.
The following result is an obvious consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 4.
Corollary 2 Let f be a vBf permutation on Fm that is weakly APN but not APN. If f (x) = xd , then for all
a ∈ Fm \ {0}, Im( ˆfa) is not a coset of a subspace W ⊆ Fm.
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5 Weakly APN functions and degrees of derivatives
Without loss of generality, in the sequel we consider only vBf’s such that f (0) = 0. Let v ∈ Fm \ {0}, we
denote by 〈 f ,v〉 the component ∑mi=1 vi fi of f , where f1, . . . , fm are the coordinate functions of f .
Definition 4 The algebraic degree of a vectorial Boolean function f is the maximal algebraic degree of the
coordinate functions of f and is denoted by deg( f ).
We recall the following non-linearity measures, as introduced in [18]:
ni( f ) := |{v ∈ Fm \ {0} | deg(〈 f ,v〉) = i}|,
and
nˆ( f ) := max
a∈Fm\{0}
|{v ∈ Fm \ {0} | deg(〈 ˆfa,v〉) = 0}|.
In other words, ni( f ) corresponds to the number of component functions of f which are of degree i and nˆ( f )
corresponds to the number of components of the derivative functions of f which are constant.
We state two lemmas useful to extend some results of [18]. First, we recall that the algebraic degree of a
permutation f (x) = xd is the Hamming weight of the binary representation of d, denoted by w(d).
Lemma 5 ([22], Corollary 6) Let f (x) = xd be a permutation. Then ˆf1 has at least one constant component
if and only if deg( f ) = 2.
Lemma 6 ([19], Theorem 1) Let f (x) = xd , with d = 22k− 2k + 1 (Kasami exponent), gcd(k,n) = s and n
s
odd. Then ˆf1 is a 2s-to-1 function.
Theorem 2 Let f be a vBf permutation such that nˆ( f ) = 0, i.e. no component of f has linear structure. Then
(i) if m = 3 then f is weakly APN;
(ii) if m = 4 then f is weakly APN;
(iii) if m = 2n, with n odd, then f is not necessarily weakly APN.
Proof (i) Let F3 = {x1, . . . ,x8} and let Ma be the matrix of dimension 3× 8, whose columns are m j =
ˆfa(x j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 8. We claim that nˆ( f ) = 0 implies rank(Ma) = 3 for any a. Otherwise, we could obtain
(0, . . . ,0) ∈ F8 from a combination of the rows of Ma, and the corresponding component of ˆfa would be
identically 0.
If f is not weakly APN, we have |Im( ˆfa)| ≤ 2 for some a∈ F3 \{0}. So we have at most 2 distinct columns,
which implies rank(Ma)≤ 2 and contradicts rank(Ma) = 3.
(ii) See [18] Proposition 2 .
(iii) Let t > 0 be such that gcd(22t+1 − 22t + 1,2m− 1) = 1, and consider the power function f (x) = xd ,
with d = 22t+1 − 22t + 1. By hypothesis gcd(2t ,m) = 2, thus, by Lemma 6, f is 4-differentially uniform and
thus weakly 4-differential uniform. Since in our case d = 22t (22t −1)+1, then w(d) = w(22t −1)+1 which
is strictly bigger than 2 for t > 0. So f is not quadratic and then, by Lemma 5, nˆ( f ) = 0.
In [18] it was shown that a weakly APN function f over F4 has n3( f ) ∈ {12,14,15}, moreover by a
computer check on the class representatives the authors exclude the case n3( f ) = 12 (Fact 4 in [18]).
We are now able to provide a formal proof.
Proposition 3 (Fact 4 in [18]) Let f : F4 → F4 be a weakly APN permutation. Then n3( f ) ∈ {14,15}.
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Proof Let f = ( f1, f2, f3, f4) with fi : F4 → F, and assume by contradiction that deg(S)≤ 2 for three distinct
linear combinations S = ∑i vi fi, that we call S1,S2,S3.
From the theory of quadratic Boolean functions (see for instance [9]) ˆSa is constant for every a ∈ V (S)
where V (S) ⊆ F4 is a vector subspace, called the set of linear structures of S. It is well-known that V (S)
has dimension 0 if and only if S is bent, it has dimension 4 if and only if S is linear (affine), and it has
dimension 2 otherwise. Since V (S) is a vector space, S3 = S1 +S2. If there exists a ∈V (Si)∩V (S j) different
from 0 for some i 6= j, then nˆ( f )≥ 2. But f weakly APN implies nˆ( f )≤ 1 (see [18] Theorem 1). Therefore,
V (Si)∩V (S j) = {0} and dim(V (Si))≤ 2 for any i.
For any i, since f is a permutation, then Si is balanced, so Si is not bent, and then
dim(V (Si)) = 2, i = 1,2,3 . (1)
Summarizing, deg(Si) = 2 for any i and V (Si)∩V (S j) = {0} for any i 6= j.
Up to an affine transformtion, since V (S1)⊕V(S2)=F4, we can assume V (S1)=Span((1,0,0,0),(0,1,0,0))
and V (S2) = Span((0,0,1,0),(0,0,0,1)).
Let S1(x) = ∑i< j ci, jxix j +∑i cixi. Since S1(x+(1,0,0,0))+ S1(x) is constant we have that ci, j = 0 if i
or j equals 1. Similarly, since S1(x+(0,1,0,0))+ S1(x) is constant we have ci, j = 0 if i or j equals 2. Then
S1(x) = x3x4 +∑i cixi and analogously we have S2(x) = x1x2 +∑i c′ixi, for some c′i’s.
So, S3(x) = x1x2 + x3x4 +∑i bixi, bi = ci + c′i, and we can compute the derivative of S3 with respect to
a = (a1,a2,a3,a4) ∈ F
4 \ {0} as
ˆ(S3)a(x) = a2x1 + a1x2 + a4x3 + a3x4 + c, where c is constant.
Hence ˆ(S3)a(x) is constant if and only if a = 0, so S3 is bent and dim(V (S3)) = 0, contradicting (1).
6 Quadratic and partially bent functions
Theorem 3 A quadratic function is APN if and only it is weakly APN.
Proof Let f be weakly APN and a 6= 0 arbitrary. Then by definition, |Im( ˆfa)|> 2m−2. Since f is quadratic,
ˆfa is affine. Then Im( ˆfa) is an affine subspace. Hence its size is a power of 2, the only possibility of being
equal 2m−1. So |Im( ˆfa)|= 2m−1 for any non-zero a, which means that ˆfa is 2-to-1 for all non-zero a.
As was shown in [26] there is no APN quadratic permutation over Fm for m even, and so, by previous
theorem, there is no weakly APN quadratic permutation over Fm for m even. This result was extended by
Nyberg [23] to the case of permutations with all components partially bent (for m even), in other words there
is no APN partially bent permutation. We are able to extend these results by relaxing the condition APN
permutations with the condition weakly APN permutation.
Definition 5 ([13]) A Boolean function f is partially bent if there exists a linear subspace V ( f ) of Fm such
that the restriction of f to V ( f ) is affine and the restriction of f to any complementary subspace U of V ( f ),
V ( f )⊕U = Fm, is bent. In that case, f can be represented as a direct sum of the restricted functions, i.e.,
f (y+ z) = f (y)+ f (z), for all z ∈V ( f ) and y ∈U .
Remark 4 The space V ( f ) is formed by the linear structures of f , in fact
f (x+ a)+ f (x) = f (y+ z+ a)+ f (y+ z)= f (y)+ f (z)+ f (a)+ f (y)+ f (z) = f (a)
where z,a ∈V ( f ) and y ∈U . Moreover, since bent function exist only in even dimension, m−dim(V ( f )) is
even. That means if m is even, the dimension of V ( f ) is even.
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Theorem 4 For m even, a weakly APN permutation has at most 2m−13 partially bent components. In partic-
ular f cannot have all partially bent components.
Proof Let f be a weakly APN permutation. Assume by contradiction that f has more than 2m−13 partially
bent components, and denote those with f1, . . . , fs. f is a permutation, then dim(V ( fi)) 6= 0 for all 1≤ i≤ s,
otherwise fi is bent and it is not balanced. From Remark 4 we have that there exist at least three nonzero
vectors in each V ( fi). So
s
∑
i=1
|V ( fi)| ≥ 3s > 2m− 1.
Thus, there exist i and j such that a ∈ V ( fi)∩V ( f j) with a 6= 0. This implies nˆ( f ) ≥ 2, which contradicts
that f is weakly APN, since in that case nˆ( f ) ≤ 1 ([18] Theorem 1).
From the fact that a quadratic Boolean function is partially bent (see for instance [23]), we have imme-
diately the following result.
Proposition 4 Let m even. Let f be a weakly APN permutation. Then f has at most 2m−2 − 1 quadratic
components.
Proof That depends on the fact that the set of components of degree less or equal to 2 is a vector space.
7 Properties linked to nˆ( f )
In this last part of the paper we give some properties linked to the value of nˆ( f ) of a vBf. For all a∈ Fm \{0},
let Va be the vector space {v ∈ Fm : deg(〈 ˆfa,v〉) = 0}. By definition, if t = maxa∈Fm\{0}dim(Va), then
nˆ( f ) = 2t − 1.
Proposition 5 Let f be a vBf and a ∈ Fm \ {0}. f (a)+V⊥a is the smallest affine subspace of Fm containing
Im( ˆfa). In particular, nˆ( f ) = 0 if and only if there does not exist a proper affine subspace of Fm containing
Im( ˆfa), for all a ∈ Fm \ {0}.
Proof Let a∈ Fm \{0}. Note that Va = {v ∈ Fm : 〈 ˆfa,v〉 is constant}. Let x ∈ Fm, then ˆfa(x) = f (a)+w, for
some w ∈ Fm, and 〈 ˆfa(x),v〉= c ∈ F for all v ∈Va. In particular c = 〈 ˆfa(0),v〉 = 〈 f (a),v〉 and so 〈w,v〉= 0,
that is, w ∈ V⊥a . Then we have Im( ˆfa) ⊆ f (a)+V⊥a . Now, let A be an affine subspace containing Im( ˆfa),
then A = f (a)+V , for some vector subspace V in Fm. For all v ∈ V⊥, we have 〈 ˆfa,v〉 = 〈 f (a),v〉 = c ∈ F
and so, by definition, V⊥ ⊆Va. Then A contains f (a)+V⊥a .
Finally, nˆ( f ) = 0 if and only if Va = {0} for all a ∈ Fm \ {0}, and so our claim follows.
Remark 5 The proposition above gives a sufficient condition, i.e. nˆ( f ) = 0, such that the derivates do not
map the message space to an affine subspace; and so a type of trapdoors can be avoided, as noted in Section
3.
The following proposition is well-known, but we propose a proof in our context.
Proposition 6 Let f : Fm → Fm be a Boolean permutation such that nˆ( f ) = 0. Then f has no partially bent
(quadratic) components.
Proof nˆ( f ) = 0 implies that the linear structures set of any component contains only 0. So if there exists a
partially bent (quadratic) component, then it is bent. But f is a permutation, then this is not possible.
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For the particular case of 4-bit S-Boxes we obtain two more results.
Corollary 3 Let f : F4 → F4 be a vBf permutation.
(i) If nˆ( f ) = 0. Then f is weakly APN and n3( f ) = 15.
(ii) If f is weakly APN and n3( f ) = 14. Then nˆ( f ) = 1.
Proof Let f be weakly APN, so nˆ( f ) ≤ 1 (see [18]). From Proposition 6, the claim follows.
So for weakly APN function f : F4 → F4 we have all the three cases. Below we provide an example for
each case reporting the algebraic normal form of the components of f :
– nˆ( f ) = 0 and n3( f ) = 15:
f1 = x1x2x3 + x2x3x4 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4
f2 = x1x2x4 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x4
f3 = x1x3x4 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x3 + x4
f4 = x2x3x4 + x1x4 + x2x4 + x2 + x3x4 + x3 + x4
– nˆ( f ) = 1 and n3( f ) = 15:
f1 = x1x3x4 + x2x3x4 + x2x3 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x1
f2 = x1x2x4 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3 + x2
f3 = x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4 + x2x3x4 + x1x2 + x3x4 + x3
f4 = x2x3x4 + x1x2 + x1x4 + x2x3 + x4
– nˆ( f ) = 1 and n3( f ) = 14:
f1 = x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x3 + x1 + x2x3x4 + x2x3 + x3x4
f2 = x1x2x4 + x1x2 + x1x3x4 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2
f3 = x1x2x4 + x1x2 + x1x3x4 + x1x3 + x2x4 + x3
f4 = x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x3x4 + x2x4 + x4
8 Conclusions
As reported in Section 2 and 3, weak differential uniformity and the cryptographic condition that the image
of the derivatives of an S-Box is never a coset of a subspace of the message space are useful to prevent hiding
certain type of trapdoors in the related cipher.
First we study the algebraic structure of the image of the derivatives of a vectorial Boolean function. In
particular we prove that for any vBf that is weakly APN but not APN, there is at least one derivative whose
image is not an affine subspace (Theorem 1). In the case of power functions, to be weakly APN but not APN
guarantees that none of the image of the derivatives is an affine subspace (Corollary 2). An interesting open
problem is to find families of vBf that are not monomial having this property.
Then we show that the sufficient condition nˆ( f ) = 0, that ensures weakly APNness for the 4-bit vBf’s,
does not guarantee this property for m-bit vBf’s with m > 4 (Theorem 2). It would be interesting to find
sufficient conditions that imply weakly APNness for any m > 4.
In Section 6 we extend some results known for the (quadratic) partially bent components of an APN
permutation to the case of weakly APN permutations.
In the last section we report some other results linked to the value of nˆ( f ), in particular we prove that
this value is zero if and only if the derivates of f do not map the message space to an affine subspace.
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